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Abstract
Personalized interventions in social services, education, and healthcare
leverage individual-level causal effect predictions in order to give the
best treatment to each individual or to prioritize program interventions
for the individuals most likely to benefit. While the sensitivity of these
domains compels us to evaluate the fairness of such policies, we show
that actually auditing their disparate impacts per standard observational
metrics, such as true positive rates, is impossible since ground truths
are unknown. Whether our data is experimental or observational, an
individual’s actual outcome under an intervention different than that
received can never be known, only predicted based on features. We
prove how we can nonetheless point-identify these quantities under the
additional assumption of monotone treatment response, which may be
reasonable in many applications. We further provide a sensitivity analysis
for this assumption by means of sharp partial-identification bounds under
violations of monotonicity of varying strengths. We show how to use our
results to audit personalized interventions using partially-identified ROC
and xROC curves and demonstrate this in a case study of a French job
training dataset.
1 Introduction
The expanding use of predictive algorithms in the public sector for risk assessment
has sparked recent concern and study of fairness considerations [3, 9, 10]. One
critique of the use of predictive risk assessment argues that the discussion
should be reframed to instead focus on the role of positive interventions in
distributing beneficial resources, such as directing pre-trial services to prevent
recidivism, rather than in meting out pre-trial detention based on a risk prediction
[8]; or using risk assessment in child welfare services to provide families with
additional childcare resources rather than to inform the allocation of harmful
suspicion [24, 51]. However, due to limited resources, interventions are necessarily
targeted. Recent research specifically investigates the use of models that predict
an intervention’s benefit in order to efficiently target their allocation, such as in
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developing triage tools to target homeless youth [36, 47]. Both ethics and law
compel such personalized interventions to be fair and to avoid disparities in how
they impact different groups defined by certain protected attributes, such as
race, age, or gender.
The delivery of interventions to better target those individuals deemed most
likely to respond well, even if a prediction or policy allocation rule does not have
access to the protected attribute, might still result in disparate impact (with
regards to social welfare) for the same reasons that these disparities occur in
machine learning classification models [18]. (See Appendix C for an expanded
discussion on our use of the term “disparate impact.”) However, in the problem
of personalized interventions, the “fundamental problem of causal inference,”
that outcomes are not observed for interventions not administered, poses a
fundamental challenge for evaluating the fairness of any intervention allocation
rule, as the true “labels” of intervention efficacy of any individual are never
observed in the dataset. Metrics commonly assessed in the study of fairness
in machine learning, such as group true positive and false positive rates, are
therefore conditional on potential outcomes which are not observed in the data
and therefore cannot be computed as in standard classification problems.
The problem of personalized policy learning has surfaced in econometrics and
computer science [35, 41], gaining renewed attention alongside recent advances
in causal inference and machine learning [4, 23, 52]. In particular, [15] analyze
optimal treatment allocations for malaria bednets with nonparametric plug-
in estimates of conditional average treatment effects, accounting for budget
restrictions; [22] use the generalized random forests method of [53] to evaluate
heterogeneity of causal effects in a program matching at-risk youth in Chicago
with summer jobs on outcomes and crime; and [36] use BART [27] to analyze
heterogeneity of treatment effect for allocation of homeless youth to different
interventions, remarking that studying fairness considerations for algorithmically-
guided interventions is necessary.
In this paper, we address the challenges of assessing the disparate impact
of such personalized intervention rules in the face of unknown ground truth
labels. We show that we can actually obtain point identification of common
observational fairness metrics under the assumption of monotone treatment
response. We motivate this assumption and discuss why it might be natural
in settings where interventions only either help or do nothing. Recognizing
nonetheless that this assumption is not actually testable, we show how to
conduct sensitivity analyses for fairness metrics. In particular, we show how
to obtain sharp partial identification bounds on the metrics of interest as we
vary the strength of violation of the assumption. We then show to use these
tools to visualize disparities using partially identified ROC and xROC curves.
We illustrate all of this in a case study of personalized job training based on a
dataset from a French field experiment.
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2 Problem Setup
We suppose we have data on individuals (X,A, T, Y ) consisting of:
• Prognostic features X ∈ X , upon which interventions are personalized;
• Sensitive attribute A ∈ A, against which disparate impact will be measured;
• Binary treatment indicator T ∈ {0, 1}, indicating intervention exposure;
and
• Binary response outcome Y ∈ {0, 1}, indicating the benefit to the individ-
ual.
Our convention is to identify T = 1 with an active intervention, such as job
training or a homeless prevention program, and T = 0 with lack thereof. Simi-
larly, we assume that a positive outcome, Y = 1, is associated with a beneficial
event for the individual, e.g., successful employment or non-recidivation. Using
the Neyman-Rubin potential outcome framework [29], we let Y (0), Y (1) ∈ {0, 1}
denote the potential outcomes of each treatment. We let the observed outcome
be the potential outcome of the assigned treatment, Y = Y (T ), encapsulating
non-interference and consistency assumptions, also known as SUTVA [49]. Im-
portantly, for any one individual, we never simultaneously observe Y (0) and
Y (1). This is sometimes termed the fundamental problem of causal inference.
We assume our data either came from a randomized controlled trial (the most
common case) or an unconfounded observational study so that the treatment
assignment is ignorable, that is, Y (1), Y (0) ⊥ T | X,A.
When both treatment and potential outcomes are binary, we can exhaustively
enumerate the four possible realizations of potential outcomes as (Y (0), Y (1)) ∈
{0, 1}2. We call units with (Y (0), Y (1)) = (0, 1) responders, (Y (0), Y (1)) = (1, 0)
anti-responders, and Y (0) = Y (1) non-responders. Such a decomposition is
also common in instrumental variable analysis [2] where the binary outcome is
take-up of treatment with the analogous nomenclature of compliers, never-takers,
always-takers, and defiers. In the context of talking about an actual outcome,
following [42], we replace this nomenclature with the notion of response rather
than compliance. We remind the reader that due to the fundamental problem of
causal inference, response type is unobserved.
We denote the conditional probabilities of each response type by
pij = pij(X,A) = P(Y (0) = i, Y (1) = j | X,A).
By exhaustiveness of these types, p00 +p01 +p10 +p11 = 1. (Note pij are random
variables.)
We consider evaluating the fairness of a personalized intervention policy
Z = Z(X,A) ∈ {0, 1}, which assigns interventions based on observable features
X,A (potentially just X). Note that by definition, the intervention has zero
effect on non-responders, negative effect on anti-responders, and a positive effect
only on responders. Therefore, in seeking to benefit individuals with limited
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resources, the personalized intervention policy should seek to target only the
responders. Naturally, response type is unobserved and the policy can only mete
out interventions based on observables.
In classification settings, minimum-error classifiers on the efficient frontier of
type-I and -II errors are given by Bayes classifiers that threshold the probability
of a positive label. In personalized interventions, policies that are on the
efficient frontier of social welfare (fraction of positive outcomes, P (Y (Z) = 1))
and program cost (fraction intervened on, P (Z = 1)) are given by thresholding
(Z = I [τ ≥ θ]) the conditional average treatment effect (CATE):
τ = τ(X,A) = E[Y (1)− Y (0) | X,A] = p01 − p10
= P(Y = 1 | T = 1, X,A)− P(Y = 1 | T = 0, X,A),
where the latter equality follows by the assumed ignorable treatment assignment.
Estimating τ from unconfounded data using flexible models has been the subject
of much recent work [27, 50, 53].
We consider observational fairness metrics in analogy to the classification
setting, where the “true label” of an individual is their responder status, R =
I [Y (1) > Y (0)]. We define the analogous true positive rate and true negative
rate for the intervention assignment Z, conditional on the (unobserved) events
of an individual being a responder or non-responder, respectively:
TPRa = P(Z = 1 | A = a, Y (1) > Y (0)),
TNRa = P(Z = 0 | A = a, Y (1) ≤ Y (0)).
(1)
2.1 Interpreting Disparities for Personalized Interventions
The use of predictive models to deliver interventions can induce disparate impact
if responding (respectively, non-responding) individuals of different groups receive
the intervention at disproportionate rates under the treatment policy. This can
occur even with efficient policies that threshold the true CATE τ and can arise
from the disparate predictiveness of X,A of response type (i.e., how far pij are
from 0 and 1). This is problematic because the choice of features X is usually
made by the intervening agent (e.g., government agency, etc.).
We discuss one possible interpretation of TPR or TNR disparities in this
setting when the intervention is the bestowal of a benefit, like access to job
training or case management. From the point of view of the intervening agent,
there are specific program goals, such as employment of the target individual
within 6 months. Therefore, false positives are costly due to program cost and
false negatives are missed opportunities. But outcomes also affect the individual’s
utility. Discrepancies in TPR across values of A are of concern since they suggest
that the needs of those who could actually benefit from intervention (responders)
in one group are not being met at the same rates as in other groups. Arguably,
for benefit-bestowing interventions, TPR discrepancies are of greater concern.
Nonetheless, from the point of view of the individual, the intervention may
always grant some positive resource (e.g., from the point of view of well-being),
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regardless of responder status, since it corresponds to access to a good (and the
individual can gain other benefits from job training that may not necessarily
align with the intervener’s program goals, such as employment in 1 year or
personal enrichment). If so, then TNR discrepancies across values of A imply a
“disparate benefit of the doubt” such that the policy disparately over-benefits
one group over another using the limited public resource without the cover of
advancing the public program’s goal, which may raise fairness and envy concerns,
especially since this “waste” is at the cost of more slots for responders.
Beyond assessing disparities in TPR and TNR for one fixed policy, we will
also use our ability to assess these over varying CATE thresholds in order to
compute xAUC metrics [33] in Section 6. These give the disparity between the
probabilities that a non-responder from group a is ranked above a responder
from group b and vice-versa. Thus, they measure the disproportionate access one
group gets relative to another in any allocation of resources that is non-decreasing
in CATE.
We emphasize that the identification arguments and bounds that we present
on fairness metrics are primarily intended to facilitate the assessment of dis-
parities, which may require further inquiry as to their morality and legality,
not necessarily to promote statistical parity via adjustments such as group-
specific thresholds, though that is also possible using our tools. We defer a
more detailed discussion to Section 8 and re-emphasize that assessing the distri-
bution of outcome-conditional model errors are of central importance both in
machine learning [10, 25, 45] and in the economic efficiency of targeting resources
[14, 16, 44].
3 Related Work
[40] consider estimating joint treatment effects of race and treatment under a deep
latent variable model to reconstruct unobserved confounding. For evaluating
fairness of policies derived from estimated effects, they consider the gap in
population accuracy Acca = P (Z = Z∗ | A = a), where Z∗ = I[τ(X) > 0] is
the (identifiable) optimal policy. In contrast, we highlight the unfairness of
even optimal policies and focus on outcome-conditional error rates (TPR, TNR),
where the non-identifiability of responder status introduces challenges regarding
identifiability.
The issue of model evaluation under the censoring problem of selective labels
has been discussed in situations such as pretrial detention, where detention
censors outcomes [32, 38]. Sensitivity analysis is used in [30] to account for
possible unmeasured confounders. The distinction is that we focus on the
targeted delivery of interventions with unknown (but estimated) causal effects,
rather than considering classifications that induce one-sided censoring but have
definitionally known effects.
Our emphasis is distinct from other work discussing fairness and causality
that uses graphical causal models to decompose predictive models along causal
pathways and assessing the normative validity of path-specific effects [34, 37],
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such as the effect of probabilistic hypothetical interventions on race variables or
other potentially immutable protected attributes. When discussing treatments,
we here consider interventions corresponding to allocation of concrete resources
(e.g., give job training), which are in fact physically manipulable by an intervening
agent. The correlation of the intervention’s conditional average treatment effects
by, say, race and its implications for downstream resource allocation are our
primary concern.
There is extensive literature on partial identification in econometrics, e.g.
[43]. In contrast to previous work that analyzes partial identification of average
treatment effects when data is confounded and using monotonicity to improve
precision [6, 13, 43], we focus on unconfounded (e.g., RCT) data and achieve full
identification by assuming monotonicity and consider sensitivity analysis bounds
for nonlinear functionals of partially identified sets, namely, true positive and
false positive rates.
4 Identifiability of Disparate Impact Metrics
Since the definitions of the disparate impact metrics in Eq. (1) are conditioned
on an unobserved event, such as the response event Y (1) > Y (0), they actually
cannot be identified from the data, even under ignorable treatment. That is, the
values of TPRa,TNRa can vary even when the joint distribution of (X,A, T, Y )
remains the same, meaning the data we see cannot possibly tell us about the
specific value of TPRa,TNRa.
Proposition 1. TPRa,TNRa (or discrepancies therein over groups) are gener-
ally not identifiable.
Essentially, Proposition 1 follows because the data only identifies the marginals
p10 + p11, p01 + p11 while TPRa,TNRa depend on the joint via p01, which can
vary even while marginals are fixed. Since this can vary independently across
values of A, discrepancies are not identifiable either.
4.1 Identification under Monotonicity
We next show identifiability if we impose the additional assumption of monotone
treatment response.
Assumption 1 (Monotone treatment response). Y (1) ≥ Y (0). (Equivalently,
p10 = 0.)
Assumption 1 says that anti-responders do not exist. In other words, the
treatment either does nothing (e.g., an individual would have gotten a job or not
gotten a job, regardless of receiving job training) or it benefits the individual
(would get a job if and only if receive job training), but it never harms the
individual. This assumption is reasonable for positive interventions. As [31]
points out, policy learning in this setting is equivalent to the binary classification
problem of predicting responder status.
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Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1,
TPRa =
E [τ | A = a, Z = 1]P (Z = 1 | A = a)
E [τ | A = a] ,
TNRa =
E [(1− τ) | A = a, Z = 0]P (Z = 0 | A = a)
E [(1− τ) | A = a] .
(2)
Since the quantities on the right hand sides in Eq. (2) are in terms of
identified quantities (functions of the distribution of (X,A, T, Y )), this proves
identifiability. Given a sample and an estimate of τ , it also provides a simple
recipe for estimation by replacing each average or probability by a sample version,
since both A and Z are discrete.
Thus, Proposition 2 provides a novel means of assessing disparate impact of
personalized interventions under monotone response. This is relevant because
monotonicity is a defensible assumption in the case of many interventions that
bestow an additional benefit, good, or resource, such as the ones mentioned in
Section 1. Nonetheless, the validity of Assumption 1 is itself not identifiable.
Therefore, should it fail even slightly, it is not immediately clear whether these
disparity estimates can be relied upon. We therefore next study a sensitivity
analysis by means of constructing partial identification bounds for TPRa,TNRa.
5 Partial Identification Bounds for Sensitivity
Analysis
We next study the partial identification of disparate impact metrics when Assump-
tion 1 fails, i.e., p10 6= 0. We first state a more general version of Proposition 2.
For any η = η(X,A), let
ρTPRa (η) :=
E [τ + η | A = a, Z = 1]P (Z = 1 | A = a)
E [τ + η | A = a] ,
ρTNRa (η) :=
E [1− (τ + η) | A = a, Z = 0]P (Z = 0 | A = a)
E [1− (τ + η) | A = a] .
Proposition 3. TPRa = ρTPRa (p10), TNRa = ρTNRa (p10).
Since the anti-responder probability p10 is unknown, we cannot use Propo-
sition 3 to identify TPRa,TNRa. We instead use Proposition 3 to compute
bounds on them by restricting p10 to be in an uncertainty set. Formally, given
an uncertainty set U for p10 (i.e., a set of functions of x, a), we define the
simultaneous identification region of the TPR and TNR for all groups a ∈ A as:
Θ =
{(
ρTPRa (η), ρ
TNR
a (η)
)
a∈A : η ∈ U
}
⊆ R2×|A|.
For brevity, we will let ρa(η) =
(
ρTPRa (η), ρ
TNR
a (η)
)
and ρ(η) = (ρa(η))a∈A.
The set Θ describes all possible simultaneous values of the group-conditional
true positive and true negative rates. As long as ∀η ∈ U we have 0 ≤ η(X,A) ≤
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min (P (Y = 1 | T = 0, X,A) ,P (Y = 0 | T = 1, X,A)) (which is identified from
the data) by Proposition 3 this set is necessarily sharp [43] given only the
restriction that p10 ∈ U . (In particular, this bound on η can be achieved by just
point-wise clipping U with this identifiable bound as necessary.) That is, given a
joint on (X,A, T, Y ), on the one hand, every ρ ∈ Θ is realized by some full joint
distribution on (X,A, T, Y (0), Y (1)) with p10 ∈ U , and on the other hand, every
such joint gives rise to a ρ ∈ Θ. In other words, Θ is an exact characterization
of the in-fact possible simultaneous values of the group-conditional TPRs and
TNRs.
Therefore, if, for example, we are interested in the minimal and maximal
possible values for the true (unknown) TPR discrepancy between groups a and
b, we should seek to compute infρ∈Θ ρTPRa − ρTPRb and supρ∈Θ ρTPRa − ρTPRb .
More generally, for any µ ∈ R2×|A|, we may wish to compute
hΘ(µ) := sup
ρ∈Θ
µ>ρ. (3)
Note that this, for example, covers the above example since for any µ we can
also take −µ. The function hΘ is known as the support function of Θ [48]. Not
only does the support function provide the maximal and minimal contrasts
in a set, it also exactly characterizes its convex hull. That is, Conv (Θ) ={
ρ : µ>ρ ≤ hΘ(µ) ∀µ
}
. So computing hΘ allows us to compute Conv (Θ).
Our next result gives an explicit program to compute the support function
when U has a product form of within-group uncertainty sets:
U = {η : η( · , a) ∈ Ua ∀a ∈ A} , (4)
which leads to Θ =
∏
a∈AΘa where Θa = {ρa(ηa) : ηa ∈ Ua}.
Proposition 4. Let rza := P (Z = z | A = a) and τza := E [τ | A = a, Z = z].
Suppose U is as in (4). Then Eq. (3) can be reformulated as:
hΘ(µ) =
∑
a∈A hΘa(µa)
hΘa(µa) = sup
ωa,ta
µTPRa r
1
a
(
taτ
1
a + E [ωa(X) | A = a, Z = 1]
)
+
µTNRa r
0
a
ta − 1 (ta
(
1− τ0a
)
+ E [ωa(X) | A = a, Z = 0])
s.t. ωa(·) ∈ ta Ua, ta
(
r0aτ
0
a + r
1
aτ
1
a
)
+ E [ωa | A = a] = 1.
For a fixed value of ta, the above program is a linear program, given that
Ua is linearly representable. Therefore a solution may be found by grid search
on the univariate ta. Moreover, if µTPRa = 0 or µTNRa = 0, the above remains a
linear program even with ta as a variable [17]. With this, we are able to express
group-level disparities through assessing the support function at specific contrast
vectors µ.
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5.1 Partial Identification under Relaxed Monotone Treat-
ment Response
We next consider the implications of the above for the following relaxation of
the monotone treatment response assumption:
Assumption 2 (B-relaxed monotone treatment response). p10 ≤ B.
Note that Assumption 2 with B = 0 recovers Assumption 1 and Assumption 2
with B = 1 is a vacuous assumption. In between these two extremes we can
consider milder or stronger violations of monotone response and the partial
identification bounds they corresponds to. This provides us with a means of
sensitivity analysis of the disparities we measure, recognizing that monotone re-
sponse may not hold exactly and that disparities may not be exactly identifiable.
For the rest of the paper, we focus solely on partial identification under Assump-
tion 2. Note that Assumption 2 corresponds exactly to the uncertainty set UB =
{η : 0 ≤ η(X,A) ≤ min (B,P (Y = 1 | T = 0, X,A) ,P (Y = 0 | T = 1, X,A))}.
We define ΘB =
∏
a∈AΘB,a to be the corresponding identification region.
Under Assumption 2, our bounds take on a particularly simple form. Let
Bza(B) = E
[
min
(
B,P (Y = 1 | T = 0, X,A) ,
P (Y = 0 | T = 1, X,A)) | A = a, Z = z]
and define
ρTPRa (B) =
(τ1a + B1a(B))r1a
τ0ar
0
a + (τ
1
a + B1a(B))r1a
,
ρTPR
a
(B) =
τ1ar
1
a
(τ0a + B0a(B))r0a + τ1ar1a
,
ρTNRa (B) =
(1− τ0a )r0a
(1− τ0a )r0a + (1− τ1a − B1a(B))r1a
,
ρTNR
a
(B) =
(1− τ0a − B0a(B))r0a
(1− τ0a − B0a(B))r0a + (1− τ1a )r1a
.
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then [ρTPR
a
(B), ρTPRa (B)] and
[ρTNR
a
(B), ρTNRa (B)] are the sharp identification intervals for TPRa and TNRa,
respectively. Moreover, (ρTPR
a
(B), ρTNR
a
(B)) ∈ ΘB,a and (ρTPRa (B), ρTNRa (B)) ∈
ΘB,a, i.e., the two extremes are simultaneously achievable.
6 Partial Identification of Group Disparities and
ROC and xROC Curves
We discuss diagnostics to summarize possible impact disparities across a range
of possible policies.
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TPR and TNR disparity. Discrepancies in model errors (TPR or TNR) are
of interest when auditing classification performance on different groups with a
given, fixed policy Z. Under Assumption 1, they are identified by Proposition 2.
Under violations of Assumption 1, we can consider their partial identification
bounds. If the minimal disparity remains nonzero, that provides strong evidence
of disparity. Similarly, if the maximal disparity is large, a responsible decision
maker should be concerned about the possibility of a disparity.
Under Assumption 2, Proposition 5 provides that the sharp identification
intervals of TPRa−TPRb and TNRa−TNRb are, respectively, given by
[ρTPR
a
(B)− ρTPRb (B), ρTPRa (B)− ρTPRb (B)],
[ρTNR
a
(B)− ρTNRb (B), ρTNRa (B)− ρTNRb (B)].
(5)
Given effect scores τ , we can then use this to plot disparity curves by plotting
the endpoints of Eq. (5) for policies Z = I[τ ≥ θ] for varying thresholds θ.
Robust ROC Curves We first define the analogous group-conditional ROC
curve corresponding to a CATE function τ . These are the parametric curves
traced out by the pairs (1− TNRa,TPRa) of policies that threshold the CATE
for varying thresholds. To make explicit that we are now computing metrics
for different policies, we use the notation ρ(η; τ ≥ θ) to refer to the metrics of
the policy Z = I [τ ≥ θ]. Under Assumption 1, Proposition 2 provides point
identification of the group-conditional ROC curve:
ROCa(τ) := {(1− ρTNRa (0; τ ≥ θ), ρTPRa (0; τ ≥ θ)) : θ ∈ R}
When Assumption 1 fails, we cannot point identify TPRa,TNRa and correspond-
ingly we cannot identify ROCa(τ). We instead define the robust ROC curve as
the union of all partially identified ROC curves. Specifically:
ΘROCa (τ) := {(1− ρTNRa (ηa; τ ≥ θ), ρTPRa (ηa; τ ≥ θ)) : θ ∈ R, ηa ∈ Ua}.
Plotted, this set provides a visual representation of the region that the true ROC
curve can lie in. We next prove that under Assumption 2, we can easily compute
this set as the area between two curves.
Proposition 6. Let U = UB. Then ΘROCa (τ) is given as the area between the two
parametric curves ROCa(τ) := {(1− ρTNRa (B; τ ≥ θ), ρTPRa (B; τ ≥ θ)) : θ ∈ R}
and ROCa(τ) := {(1− ρTNRa (B; τ ≥ θ), ρTPRa (B; τ ≥ θ)) : θ ∈ R}.
This follows because the extremes are simultaneously achievable as noted in
Proposition 5. We highlight, however, that the lower (resp., upper) ROC curve
may not be simultaneously realizable as an ROC curve of any single policy.
Robust xROC Curves Comparison of group-conditional ROC curves may
not necessarily show impact disparities as, even in standard classification settings
ROC curves can overlap despite disparate impacts [25, 33]. At the same time,
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comparing disparities for fixed policies Z with fixed thresholds may not accurately
capture the impact of using τ for rankings. [33] develop the xAUC metric for
assessing the bipartite ranking quality of risk scores, as well as the analogous
notion of a xROC curve which parametrically plots the TPR of one group vs.
the FPR of another group, at any fixed threshold. This is relevant if effect
scores τ are used for downstream decisions by different facilities with different
budget constraints or if the score is intended to be used by a “human-in-the-
loop” exercising additional judgment, e.g., individual caseworkers as in the
encouragement design of [12].
Under Assumption 1, we can point identify TPRa,TNRa, so, following [33],
we can define the point-identified xROC curve as
xROCa,b(τ) = {(1− ρTNRb (0; τ ≥ θ), ρTPRa (0; τ ≥ θ)) : θ ∈ R}.
Without Assumption 1, we analogously define the robust xROC curve as the
union of all partially identified xROC curves:
ΘxROCa,b (τ) = {(1− ρTNRb (ηa; τ ≥ θ), ρTPRa (ηa; τ ≥ θ)) : θ ∈ R, ηa ∈ Ua}.
Proposition 7. Let U = UB. Then ΘxROCa,b (τ) is given as the area between
the two parametric curves xROCa,b(τ) := {(1 − ρTNRb (B; τ ≥ θ), ρTPRa (B; τ ≥
θ)) : θ ∈ R} and xROCa,b(τ) := {(1− ρTNRb (B; τ ≥ θ), ρTPRa (B; τ ≥ θ)) : θ ∈ R}.
This follows because UB takes the form of a product set over a ∈ A.
7 Case Study: Personalized Job Training
(Behaghel et al.)
We consider a case study from a three-armed large randomized controlled trial
that randomly assigned job-seekers in France to a control-group, a job training
program managed by a public vendor, and an out-sourced program managed by
a private vendor [11]. While the original experiment was interested in the design
of contracts for program service delivery, we consider a task of heterogeneous
causal effect estimation, motivated by interest in personalizing different types
of counseling or active labor market programs that would be beneficial for the
individual. Recent work in policy learning has also considered personalized
job training assignment [35, 52] and suggested excluding sensitive attributes
from the input to the decision rule for fairness considerations, but without
consideration of fairness in the causal effect estimation itself and how significant
impact disparities may still remain after excising sensitive attributes because of
it.
We focus on the public program vs. control arm, which enrolled about 7950
participants in total, with n1 = 3385 participants in the public program. The
treatment arm, T = 1, corresponds to assignment to the public program. The
original analysis suggests a small but statistically significant positive treatment
effect of the public program, with an ATE of 0.023. We omit further details on
11
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Figure 1: TPR and TNR disparity curves and bounds on French job training
dataset (Eq. (5))
the data processing to Appendix B. We consider the group indicators: nationality
(0, 1 denoting French nationals vs. non-French, respectively), gender (denoting
woman vs. non-woman), and age (below the age of 26 vs. above). (Figures for
gender appear in Appendix B.)
In Fig. 1, we plot the identified “disparity curves” of Eq. (5) corresponding
to the maximal and minimal sensitivity bounds on TPR and TNR disparity
between groups. Levels of shading correspond to different values of B, with color
legend at right. We learn τ by the Generalized Random Forests method of [5, 53]
and use sample splitting, learning τ on half the data and using our methods to
assess bounds on ρTPR, ρTNR and other quantities with out-of-sample estimates
on the other half of the data. We bootstrap over 50 sampled splits and average
disparity curves to reduce sample uncertainty.
In general, the small probability of being a responder leads to increased sen-
sitivity of TPR estimates (wide identification bands). The curves and sensitivity
bounds suggest that with respect to nationality and gender, there is small or no
disparity in true positive rates but the true negative rates for nationality, gender,
and age may differ significantly across groups, such that non-women would have
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Figure 2: ROC and xROC for A = nationality, age on French job training dataset
a higher chance of being bestowed job-training benefits when they are in fact
not responders. However, TPR disparity by age appears to hold with as much
as -0.1 difference, with older actually-responding individuals being less likely
to be given job training than younger individuals. Overall, this suggests that
differences in heterogeneous treatment effects across age categories could lead to
significant adverse impact on older individuals.
This is similarly reflected in the robust ROC, xROC curves (Fig. 2). Despite
possibly small differences in ROCs, the xROCs indicate strong disparities: the
sensitivity analysis suggests that the likelihood of ranking a non-responding
young individual above a responding old individual (xAUC [33]) is clearly larger
than the symmetric error, meaning that older individuals who benefit from the
treatment may be disproportionately shut out of it as seats are instead given to
non-responding younger individuals.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
We presented identification results and bounds for assessing disparate model
errors of causal-effect maximizing treatment policies, which can lead disparities
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in access to those who stand to benefit from treatment across groups. Whether
this is “unfair” would naturally rely on one’s normative assumptions. One
such is “claims across outcomes,” that individuals have a claim to the public
intervention if they stand to benefit, which can be understood within [1]’s
axiomatic justification of fair distribution. There may also be other justice-based
considerations, e.g. minimax fairness. We discuss this more extensively in
Appendix C.
With the new ability to assess disparities using our results, a second natural
question is whether these disparities warrant adjustment, which is easy to do
given our tools combined with the approach of [25]. This question again is
dependent both on one’s viewpoint and ultimately on the problem context, and
we discuss it further in Appendix C. Regardless of normative viewpoints, auditing
allocative disparities that would arise from the implementation of a personalized
rule must be a crucial step of a responsible and convincing program evaluation.
We presented fundamental identification limits to such assessments but provided
sensitivity analyses that can support reliable auditing.
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A Omitted proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove this we exhibit a simple example satisfying
ignorability where both TPRa,TNRa and differences therein varies while the
joint distribution of (X,A, T, Y ) does not.
Let X = {0, 1}, Z = I [X = 1], P (T = t,X = x | A = a) = 14 , P (A = a) =
1/ |A|. To specify a joint distribution of (X,A, T, Z, Y (1), Y (0)) that satisfies
ignorable treatment, it only remains to specify pij .
Note that in this case
TPRa =
p01(1, a)
p01(0, a) + p01(1, a)
, TPRa =
1− p01(0, a)
2− p01(0, a)− p01(1, a) .
The result follows by noting that where the corresponding joint distribution of
(X,A, T, Z, Y ) is completely specified by p01 +p11, p10 +p11, while p01 could vary
as long as these sums are neither 0 nor 1. Since we can vary this independently
across values of A, differences are not identifiable either.
Proof of Proposition 2.
P(Z = 1 | A = a, Y (1) > Y (0))
=
P(Y (1) > Y (0) | A = a, Z = 1)P(Z = 1 | A = a)
P(Y (1) > Y (0) | A = a)
=
E[E[Y (1) = 1 | T=1A=a,X=x]− E[Y (0) = 1 | T=0A=a,X=x] | Z=1A=a]P(Z = 1 | A = a)
E[P(Y (1) = 1 | T=1A=a,X=x)− P(Y (0) = 1 | T=0A=a,X=x) | A = a]
=
E[τ(X,A) | Z=1A=a]P(Z = 1 | A = a)
E[τ(X,A) | A = a]
where the first equality holds by Bayes’ rule, the second by iterating expectations
on X and Assumption 1, and the third by unconfoundedness and consistency
of potential outcomes. The proof for identification of TNR is identical for the
quantity P(Z = 0 | A = a, Y (1) ≤ Y (0)).
Proof of Proposition 3. Recalling that CATE identifies, under violations of As-
sumption 1
τ = E[Y (1)− Y (0) | X,A] = p01 − p10,
=
E[τ + η | Z=1A=a]P(Z = 1 | A = a)
E[τ + η | A = a] =
(p01 − p10 + p10)P(Z = 1 | A = a)
E[(p01 − p10 + p10) | A = a]
= P(Z = 1 | A = a, Y (1) > Y (0))
Proof of Proposition 4. The support function evaluated at µ is:
max
η
∑
a∈A
µTPRa
E [τ + η | A = a, Z = 1] r1a
E [τ + η | A = a] + µ
TNR
a
E [1− (τ + η) | A = a, Z = 0] ra0
E [1− (τ + η) | A = a]
s.t. 0 ≤ η(x, a) ≤ Bza(B), ∀x ∈ X , ∀a ∈ A
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We apply the Charnes-Cooper transformation [17]with the bijection ta = 1E[τ+η|A=a] , ωa =
ηta. The denominator of the second term under this bijection is equivalently
E [1− (τ + η) | A = a] = 1− 1
ta
such that we can rewrite the second term as
µTNRa r
0
a
(
1
1− 1/taE [1− τ |
A=a
Z=0] +
1/ta
1− 1/taE [ωa |
A=a
Z=0]
)
=
µTNRa r
0
a
ta − 1 (t E [1− τ |
A=a
Z=0] + E [ωa | A=aZ=0])
and the objective function overall as:
max
η
∑
a∈A
(µTPRa r
1
a)(taτ
1
a + E [ωa | A=aZ=1]) +
µTNRa r
0
a
ta − 1 (ta (1− τ
0
a ) + E [ωa | A=aZ=0])
The new constraint set (including the constraint yielding the definition of ta)
is:
U = {E [τta + ωa | A = a] = 1, ωa(x, a) ≤ taBza(B), ∀x ∈ X , ∀a ∈ A}
Proof of Proposition 5. We first consider the case of maximizing or minimizing
the TPR.
We leverage the invariance in the objective function under the surjection on
η(x, a) to its marginal expectation over a Z = z,A = a partition.
w(x, a) =
{
E [η | Z = 1, A = a] if Z = 1
E [η | Z = 0, A = a] if Z = 0
Therefore we can reparametrize the program as optimizing over coefficients
x, y of the optimal solution, w(x, y) = xI[Z = 0]+yI[Z = 1]. Define the fractional
objective
g(α, β) =
E [τ + xI[Z = 0] + yI[Z = 1] | A = a, Z = 1]P (Z = 1 | A = a)
E [τ + xI[Z = 0] + yI[Z = 1] | A = a]
=
(E [τ | A = a, Z = 1] + y)r1a
E [τ | A = a] + xr0a + yr1a
First note that without loss of generality that when maximizing, we can set
x = 0 since this decreases the objective regardless of the value of y. We can
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consider the constrained problem maxy≤B h(y) where h(y) = g(0, y). Then we
have the first and second derivatives,
∂h
∂y
=
r1a(E[τ | A = a]− E[τ | Z = 1, A = a]
(yr1a + E[τ | A = a])2
,
∂2h
∂β2
=
(r1a)
2(E[τ | A = a]− E[τ | Z = 1, A = a])
(yr1a + E[τ | A = a])3
By inspection, since y ≥ 0 we have that ∂2h∂y2 ≥ 0 so the function is convex.
So when maximizing h on the constraints for y, it attains optimal value at the
boundary (since h is increasing). When minimizing, note that the derivative is
not vanishing anywhere on the constraint set so it suffices to check the endpoints,
where the minimum is achieved at β = 0.
We now consider the case of minimizing or maximizing the TNR.
Now consider a generic f(x) = a−bxc−bx−dy which represents the TNR sensitivity
bound with ω = xI[Z = 0] + yI[Z = 1], and the constants
a = r0a − E[τ | Z = 0, A = a], c = 1− E[τ | A = a]
b = r0a, d = r
1
a
Without loss of generality we know that we can set y to its upper bound B when
maximizing as we are only increasing the objective value; then c′ = c−Br1a. We
verify that the second derivative is negative, so that the function is concave:
∂2f
∂x2
=
2b2(a− c′)
(c′ − bx)3 =
2(r0a)
2(r0a − E[τ | Z = 0, A = a]− (1− E[τ | A = a]−Br1a))
(1− E[τ | A = a]−Br1a)− xr0a
Checking the sign of the numerator simplifies to checking the sign of
a− c′ = (−r1a + E[τ +B | Z = 1, A = a]))
which is negative. The denominator is lower bounded by 1− E[τ | A = a]−B
which is always positive: therefore the problem is concave. The first derivative
∂f
∂x =
b(a−c′)
(c′−bx)2 is negative on the domain; therefore the maximum is achieved at
x = 0. Therefore, when maximizing, ω = BI[Z = 1].
For minimizing the TPR, we take a similar approach: analogously, we can
set y to its lower bound without loss of generality. Following the same analysis,
the function is still concave ∂
2f
∂x2 =
2b2(a−c′)
(c′−bx)3 since −r1a − E[τ | A = a] < 0
and decreasing with nonzero first-derivative; so the minimum is achieved at
ω = I[Z = 0]B.
B Behaghel et al. Job Training
We processed the data using replication files available with the AEJ: Applied
Economics journal electronic supplement. For the sake of simplicity, we analyze
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Figure 3: Diagnostics for gender protected attribute for Section 7 (not-woman
vs. woman)
the trial as if it were a randomized controlled trial (without accounting for
noncompliance or different randomization probabilities that differ by region).
Thus, we consider intention-to-treat effects (as intention to treat is ultimately
the policy lever available). We further restricted some covariates, omitting
some where personalized allocation based on these covariates seemed unilkely for
fairness reasons. The covariates we retain include: length of previous employment,
salary, education level, reason for unemployment, region, years of experience at
previous job, statistical risk level, job search type (full-time or non-full time),
wage target, time of first unemployment spell, job type, and number of children.
An interacted linear model indicates potential heterogeneity of treatment
effect with significance on college education, economic layoff, those seeking work
due to fixed term contracts or those with previous layoffs.
C Substantive Discussion: Fairness vs. Justice
We first caveat our use of “disparate impact”: while our selection of protected
attibutes parallels choices of protected attributes that appear elsewhere in the
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Figure 4: ROC curves under Assumption 1 for Section 7
literature on fair machine learning, for the case of interventions, there may not
be precedent from discrimination case law, nonetheless assessing fairness with
respect to these social groups may be of concern. We view disparate impact in
this domain as assessing fairness of outcome rates under a personalization model.
Should true positive rates be adjusted for? Our presentation of an iden-
tification strategy of fairness metrics for allocating interventions with unknown
causal effects begs the question: should disparities in TPR and FNR be ad-
justed for in the interventional welfare setting? Is responder-accuracy parity a
meaningful prescriptive notion of fairness?
One critique of outcome-conditional fair classification metrics recognizes the
dependence of false positive rates on the underlying base rate, P(Y = 1 | A = a),
[19, 20]. The equivalent situation occurs when the within-group ATE varies by
the protected attribute, e.g. E[τ | A = a] differs.
Ultimately, external domain knowledge is required to adjudicate whether
group-wide disparities in ATE should be adjusted for, or to decide which norma-
tive notion of distributive justice or fairness is appropriate. For example, consider
the case of job training. From an economic perspective, multiple mechanisms
could explain heterogeneity in CATE by race. Active labor market programs
(see [21]) may be less effective for one group vs. another group due to the pres-
ence of labor-market discrimination. Alternatively, they could be less effective
due to correlation of group status and efficacy that is mediated by occupation
choice: one group may be more interested in labor markets where the primary
benefits of job search counseling, in reducing search frictions, are not barriers
to employment in the first place relative to other factors such as skills gaps.
Intuitively, the former mechanism of ATE variation by group reflects a notion of
“disparity” which remains problematic, while the latter may seem to reflect an
unproblematic causal mechanism. While mediation analysis and fairness defined
in terms of path-specific effects could further decompose the treatment effect
along these stated mechanisms, in policy settings, collecting all of the relevant
information can be burdensome, and deciding on a causal graph can be difficult.
Claims Across OutcomesWe first outline different frameworks for thinking
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about fairness/equity of algorithms and interventions. Analogous to the proposals
arising from metrics proposed in fairness in machine learning, one might view
the decision-maker’s concern to be of ensuring accuracy parity, that the decisions
meted out are overall beneficial to individual. We view a theory of fairness that
assesses disparities in outcome-conditional error rates in the context of a theory
of normative claims arising from “claims across outcomes”. [1] develops a “claims
across outcomes” framework of fairness and social welfare, in the context of an
overall welfarist theory of justice.
On the one hand, fair classification from the point of view of assessing or
equalizing TPR or TNR disparities may be interpreted in a claims context as:
for an individual with “true outcome” Y and covariates X, an individual with
the true label Y = 1 as having a comparative claim for Yˆ = 1, if the predictor Yˆ
is an allocation tool. We can map the setting of personalized interventions to the
“claims across outcomes” setting: the potential outcomes framework posits for
each individual the random variables of outcomes Y (0), Y (1). In the responder
setting, the true label is responder status Y (1) > Y (0). However, since these
are jointly unobservable, in situations where heterogeneous treatment effects are
plausible, the best guess is an individual-level treatment effect conditional on
covariates, E[Y (0) | X = x],E[Y (1) | X = x]. In this interventional setting, one
can think of individuals having claims in favor of favorable outcomes, e.g. a
claim in favor of Y (1) if Y (1) > Y (0).
For the case of interventions, classification decisions Z are allocative of real
interventions, and we argue that implicitly, the consideration of social welfare
(balancing efficiency and program costs) is an important factor in the original
design of social programs or personalized interventions. This is in sharp contrast
to the literature on fair classification which considers settings such as lending
in finance, or risk prediction in the criminal justice system, where overriding
concerns are primarily those of vendor utility.
On the other side of the spectrum, we can recall axiomatically justified social
welfare functions that apply to the case of deterministic resource allocation,
where outcomes are generally known. A decision-maker might also be concerned
with equity considerations, adopting a min-max welfare criterion, appealing
to Rawlsian justice frameworks. Another approach is simply assessing the
population cardinal welfare of the allocation, e.g. the policy value E[Y (pi(X))] or
a social-welfare transformation thereof, E[g(Y (pi(X)))]. The literature on policy
learning addresses welfare functionals that are linear functionals of potential
outcomes, see [35]. Cardinal welfare constraints such as those studied in [26] can
be applied with an imputed CATE function.
Comparison to other work on fair classification and welfare. [39] study
the implications of classifier-based decisions, as well as proposals for statistical
parity, on group welfare. Their work addresses selection rules that have known
marginal impacts by group. [28] studies the welfare weights implied by classifica-
tion parity metrics and shows that enforcing classification parity metrics are not
Pareto-improving. Rather than studying the welfare implications of classification
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parity, we are concerned with assessing non-identifiable model errors in the
causal-effect personalized intervention setting. Since in the personalized interven-
tion setting, welfare is a primary objective for the Planner (e.g. social services,
or social protection more broadly), modulo cost considerations, combining the
distributional information from identification of classification errors with other
social welfare objectives is of possible interest.
We next aim to provide concrete examples of discussions regarding the
distributional impacts of interventions, in order to provide additional context
on different contexts wherein different notions of “fairness” from the fairness in
machine learning literature map onto welfare or justice concerns, as stated in
discussions on interventional outcomes.
Lexicographic fairness or maximin (Rawlsian) fairness.
In a large multi-site graduation trial on testing an intensive, composite
intervention targeted at the "ultra-poor", which comprised wraparound services
including coaching and revenue-generating resources, still the poorest seemed
to benefit least from the intervention in terms of sustained revenue [7]. In
this setting, concerns about maximin fairness (Rawlsian justice) might override
considerations of efficiency insofar as one might be willing to invest resources to
help the worst-off on humanitarian grounds.
Universalism.
Criticisms of targeted policies in general note practical difficulties introduced
by imposing and enforcing eligibility guidelines. [46]. Although discussion of
resource constraints may be used to justify a targeting scheme, critics of targeting
argue that the most efficient targeting is not as welfare-improving as simply
advocating for greater resources [24].
Additional distributional preferences on Y (Z) with respect to eq-
uitable or redistributive aims of the policy.
[14] consider profiling based on covariates as a means of allocating government
services, in the example of allocating predicting unemployment duration to
allocate reemployment services. They outline competing equity vs. efficiency
concerns, in the case that unemployment duration is correlated with treatment
efficacy (e.g efficacy of reemployment services), and conclude that “ tradeoffs
between alternative social goals in designing profiling systems are likely to be
empirically important... the form and extent of these tradeoffs may depend
on empirical relationships between the impacts of the program being allocated
and the equity-related characteristics of potential participants." While outcome-
conditional true positive rates or true negative rates compare model performance
across binary protected attributes, program designers may remain concerned
regarding the distribution of benefits. [? ] consider “removing the veil of
ignorance” under the simplifying of constant treatment response to consider
distributional (quantile) treatment effects, as a relaxation of the anonymity
axiom of cardinal social welfare. Distributional preferences are relevant when
program designers are concerned about model performance at finer-grained levels
than discrete protected attribute.
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